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This paper analyzes an urn-ball matching model in which workers decide how intensively 
they sample job openings and apply at a stochastic number of suitable vacancies. 
Equilibrium is not constrained efficient; entry is excessive and search intensity can be too 
high or too low. Moreover, an inefficient discouraged-worker effect among homogenous 
workers emerges under adverse labor market conditions. Unlike existing coordination-friction 
economies with fixed search intensity, the model can account for the empirical relation 
between the job-finding rate and the vacancy-unemployment ratio, provided that search costs 
are small and that search intensity is sufficiently procyclical. 
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Search and matching models are widely used to address various labor market phe-
nomena, such as unemployment, worker and job ﬂows, and wage dispersion. A large
portion of the literature utilizes the idea of a reduced–form matching function which
maps the stocks of searching workers and ﬁrms into the ﬂow of new matches. Despite
of its modeling advantages, this approach suﬀers from two limitations. One is its
inability to deal with heterogeneity convincingly. Of course, the foremost purpose of
the matching function is to abstract from any explicit source of frictions (including
heterogeneity) to describe the implications of costly trading in the labor market with
a minimum amount of complexity. Yet, many important issues (for example, the
pattern of skill premia) require an explicit analysis of how heterogeneity aﬀects labor
market outcomes.1 The other limitation is that a reduced–form matching function
is, by construction, invariant to policy. Again a more explicit model of frictions
is needed to address how policy aﬀects the matching relationship (see also Lagos
(2000) and Shimer (2007)).
There is a large literature on microeconomic foundations behind the aggregate
matching function; see section 3 of Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a survey.
One such foundation rests on coordination frictions; early contributions are Butters
(1977), Hall (1977) and Montgomery (1991), more recent ones are Burdett, Shi, and
Wright (2001), Julien, Kennes and King (2000, 2006) and Albrecht, Gautier, and
Vroman (2006). The key idea is simple: since workers do not coordinate their ap-
plication decisions and ﬁrms do not coordinate their job–oﬀer decisions, some ﬁrms
end up with no applications while others get many, and some workers obtain several
job oﬀers while others have none. So at the end of every period, unﬁlled jobs and
unemployed workers coexist. These models give rise to aggregate matching functions
which typically have constant returns in economies with a large number of workers
and jobs.
Still there are a few open issues with coordination–friction models. One is that search
intensity is typically held constant. Although it is straightforward to include variable
1There is a number of papers utilizing reduced–form matching functions in models with het-
erogenous jobs or heterogenous skills (e.g. Acemoglu (2001) and Albrecht and Vroman (2002)).
But such models must rest on ad–hoc assumptions on how workers and jobs of diﬀerent types are
matched.
1search intensity in standard search models with exogenous matching functions (see
Chapter 5 of Pissarides (2000)), it is a less obvious matter in economies where
matching frictions result explicitly from coordination problems. Work by Albrecht,
Gautier, and Vroman (2006), Galenianos and Kircher (2008) and Kircher (2007)
identiﬁes search intensity with the number of applications that a worker sends.
However, because of the discrete–choice nature of the worker’s decision problems,
equilibrium is diﬃcult to characterize analytically. Also it is not obvious whether
the number of applications is the right measure for search intensity. Chance plays an
important role in the search for jobs; some workers who search hard may simply be
unlucky, ﬁnd few suitable job openings and send few applications. Others who spend
less time on search, may notice a larger number of adequate job openings and send
more applications. A second open issue is quantitative: can coordination–friction
models match the empirical relation between the vacancy–unemployment ratio and
the job–ﬁnding rate? Recently, Mortensen (2007) and Shimer (2007) have analyzed
microfoundations of the matching function which are based on mismatch and which
generate a reasonable ﬁt of the matching function and of the Beveridge curve. To
my knowledge, these quantitative features have not been explored for models with
coordination frictions thus far.2
This paper addresses these two issues. The ﬁrst contribution is theoretical and is the
content of Section 2. I analyze an urn–ball matching model in which workers decide
about the rate at which they sample job openings (“search intensity”) and apply
at all suitable jobs they observe. For a given search intensity, the actual number
of suitable jobs (and so the number of applications) is stochastic. The expected
number of applications, however, increases proportionately with search intensity.
As applications are sent randomly, wages are determined by ex–post competition,
according to the same bidding game as in Julien, Kennes and King (2000, 2006) and
Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2006). Workers with at least two oﬀers receive the
competitive wage, those who have only one oﬀer are paid the reservation wage. A key
advantage of my model is that search intensity is a continuous choice variable, which
makes the model tractable and allows for an explicit equilibrium characterization
using ﬁrst–order conditions. When labor market conditions are good, there are many
job openings per worker and all workers search with the same intensity. With less
2Julien, Kennes, and King (2006) examine a coordination–friction model quantitatively, but
their focus is wage dispersion, and not the matching–function elasticity.
2favorable conditions, however, there are fewer job openings and it may happen that
no symmetric equilibrium in pure search–intensity strategies exists. Instead, some
workers are active and search with a common positive intensity, while others remain
inactive and decide not to search at all. Thus, the model can describe endogenous
nonparticipation in an environment where all workers are equally productive and
have the same taste for leisure. When comparing these equilibrium outcomes to
the choice of a social planner, I obtain the following results: (i) nonparticipation is
never constrained eﬃcient; (ii) entry is always excessive, for the same reason as in
Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2006), and (iii) search intensity can be too high or
too low.
Section 3 contains the quantitative exploration of this model. In Section 3.1 I
show that existing coordination–friction models, with ﬁxed search intensity and
with a reasonable choice of the period length, are unable to account for the empirical
elasticity of the matching function. Speciﬁcally, the job–ﬁnding rate responds too
little to variations in the vacancy–unemployment ratio. I then go on to examine
a dynamic version of my model in which the parameters of a reduced–form search
cost function are calibrated so as to match both the mean job–ﬁnding rate and its
elasticity with respect to the vacancy–unemployment ratio. I ﬁnd that search costs
are quantitatively small (less than 1% of the utility ﬂow of an unemployed worker)
but search intensity responds strongly and positively to productivity. Nonetheless,
variable search intensity ampliﬁes the economy’s reaction to a productivity shock
only little.
2 The static model
2.1 The setup
Consider a one–period economy with a large number M of identical workers and
a large number of N of identical ﬁrms, each creating one vacancy. The number of
workers is ﬁxed, but the number of ﬁrms is determined from a free–entry condition.
I consider the limit where both M and N tend to inﬁnity and where q = M/N,
the number of workers per job opening, is positive and ﬁnite. All agents are risk
neutral and aim to maximize their expected income net of search costs. At the end
of the period, unemployment income is zero and employed workers produce p units
3of output (=job surplus). I consider the following sequence of events.
Stage I Firms enter at marginal cost c(1/q) where c is a weakly increasing function
of the number of active ﬁrms per worker.
Stage II Every worker decides search intensity λ at cost k(λ), where k is increasing
and convex in λ ≥ 0. If a worker searches with intensity λ, he observes a
suitable vacancy at any given ﬁrm with probability λ/N and applies there.
These stochastic events are independent across workers and ﬁrms.
Stage III Each ﬁrm makes a wage oﬀer to at most one applicant, rejecting all
others.
Stage IV Workers credibly reveal to ﬁrms how many oﬀers they have, and ﬁrms
can simultaneously revise their initial bids.
Stage V Workers decide what oﬀer (if any) to accept.
I impose the usual anonymity restriction that every worker treats all (identical)
ﬁrms equally (at stage V) and that every ﬁrm treats all workers equally (at stage
III).
Two remarks are in order. First, the speciﬁcation that marginal entry costs are
not constant is needed to limit entry in an equilibrium where some workers are
inactive. The assumption can be justiﬁed, for example, by non–labor inputs in ﬁxed
supply (e.g. land) whose prices increase in the number of active ﬁrms. Second,
search intensity is a continuous variable which determines the likelihood λ/N that
a worker observes a suitable job opening at any ﬁrm. This likelihood is plausibly
proportional to 1/N: the worker samples a certain (random) segment of the labor
market whose size increases with search intensity λ. If the number of ﬁrms becomes
larger, the size of the sampled segment stays the same, but the probability that a
given ﬁrm belongs to this segment falls with factor 1/N.
In the large economy, the number of applications (per worker and per job) are












4Conversely, if all workers search with intensity λ, a ﬁrm receives applications from












Thus the expected number of applications per worker is λ and the expected number
of applications per ﬁrm is λq.
The last three stages of this game have the following solution. Firms oﬀer the
reservation wage at stage III, revising the oﬀer at stage IV only if the worker reveals
another oﬀer, in which case Bertrand competition drives wage oﬀers to the marginal
product. At the last stage, anonymity implies that workers randomize between
equal oﬀers. In this respect, my model resembles those of Julien, Kennes, and King
(2000) and Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2006) where workers with only one oﬀer
are paid the monopsony wage and workers with multiple oﬀers receive marginal
product. The setting of Julien et al. is the limiting case of my model where k(.) = 0
and λ/N = 1, so that every worker applies at all jobs. In the model of Albrecht et
al. all workers send the same number of applications. Here, in contrast, the number
of applications is stochastic, reﬂecting the role of chance in the search process.
Workers do not decide at how many ﬁrms they apply, but rather how intensively
they sample job openings. The model of Albrecht et al. also has an (irrelevant)
wage posting stage prior to the application stage where ﬁrms commit to a lower
wage bound which coincides in equilibrium with the reservation wage. My model
has a diﬀerent interpretation in that workers do not observe any job postings at
the outset. Only after sampling, they apply to all suitable vacancies at zero cost.
Therefore search in this model is random rather than directed.3
2.2 The matching function
Before solving the model, it is useful to consider the matching function of this model.
Suppose, for the time being, that all workers decide the same search intensity λ at
stage II. For any worker i the probability to get an oﬀer from ﬁrm j, conditional on
3Nonetheless, in an extension of this model with heterogenous job types, workers might “direct
search” by deciding how intensively they sample jobs of diﬀerent types.
5i applying at j, is4
z ≡ 1 − e
−λq
λq . (1)









1 − (1 − z)
n
i
= 1 − e
−λz = 1 − e
− 1−e−λq
q ≡ m(q,λ) . (2)
The matching rate for workers is increasing and concave in the job–worker ratio
1/q (as usual), and it is strictly increasing in λ: the more applications workers
send on average, the more likely it is that every worker receives an oﬀer. Such a
result is not obvious; in fact it does not hold in the model of Albrecht, Gautier,
and Vroman (2006) where the matching rate can be declining in the ﬁxed (non–
stochastic) number of applications. The reason for their result is that there are two
coordination frictions with multiple applications. The ﬁrst friction is based on lack
of coordination between workers: some ﬁrms receive no applications while others
receive multiple applications since workers do not coordinate at the application
stage. The second friction is due to a lack of coordination between ﬁrms at the
job oﬀer stage: some workers do not receive any oﬀer, others have multiple oﬀers.
Raising the number of applications mitigates the ﬁrst friction but aggravates the
second one: it becomes more likely that multiple ﬁrms contact the same worker. In
my model the ﬁrst eﬀect always dominates so that the number of matches is globally
increasing in the common search intensity.
When λ → ∞, workers apply at all ﬁrms at stage I and the matching function is
mJ(q) ≡ 1−e−1/q, the same as in the model of Julien, Kennes, and King (2000). In
this limit only the second coordination friction is at work. In the model of Albrecht
et al. (2006), the matching function is mA(q,a) ≡ 1−[1−(1−e−aq)/(aq)]a when all
workers send a applications; again the matching function of Julien et al. emerges as
the special case a → ∞. For ﬁnite a, it may be that mA(q,a) > mJ(q), so matching
is more eﬃcient with fewer applications. In my model, in contrast, matching is
always more eﬃcient the more applications are sent, i.e. m(q,λ) < mJ(q) holds for
ﬁnite λ. It can also be shown that m(q,λ) < mA(q,λ); matching is more eﬃcient
4The derivation is standard: Prob(i gets oﬀer from j | i applies at j)Prob(i applies at j)= z·λ/N
is equal to Prob(j gets ≥ 1 appl.)Prob(i gets oﬀer from j | j gets ≥ 1 appl.)= (1 − e−λq) · 1/M.
Solving yields z.
6when all workers send the same number of applications a = λ than when they
randomize applications from a Poisson distribution with mean λ.
2.3 Equilibrium search intensity
Consider the search intensity decision of workers at stage II after ﬁrm entry, so the
worker–job ratio q is given. A worker obtains income p if he receives two or more
oﬀers at stage III, but he ends up with zero income otherwise. The probability to
have two or more oﬀers, conditional on n applications, is
1 − (1 − z)
n − nz(1 − z)
n−1 .









1 − (1 − z)
n − nz(1 − z)
n−1
i
= 1 − e
−λz(1 + λz) .
When an individual worker in a large market decides λ, he takes z (the probability








p − k(λ) .
This objective function is typically not concave; for many cost functions it is convex
at low values of λ and concave at higher values. Moreover, λ = 0 is always a local
maximum when k′(0) > 0 holds. An interior (i.e. active search) local maximum
must satisfy the ﬁrst–order condition U′





Whenever there exists a pure–strategy equilibrium where all workers choose the same
search intensity λ∗ > 0, it follows from (1) and (3) that λ∗ solves
k






2 p . (4)
To obtain analytical results, consider the uniformly elastic search cost function
k(λ) = kλ1+a/(1 + a) with a ≥ 0 and k > 0. Provided that the elasticity is large
enough (i.e. the function is suﬃciently convex), a unique pure strategy equilibrium
must exist.
7Proposition 1: Let k(λ) = kλ1+a/(1+a) with a > 1. Then, for any given q, there
exists a unique equilibrium of the stage II subgame where all workers search with the
same intensity λ∗ > 0 which is increasing in p/k.
Proof: Appendix.
When the cost function is not suﬃciently convex, existence of a pure–strategy equi-
librium with active search requires that labor market conditions are suﬃciently good
from the workers’ perspective; that is, productivity must be high enough and there
must be suﬃciently many jobs per worker. Otherwise, the symmetric equilibrium is
either one in “mixed strategies” where only a fraction of workers searches actively,
or it is a no–activity equilibrium.
Proposition 2: Let k(λ) = kλ1+a/(1 + a) with a ∈ [0,1), and let x be the unique
positive solution of ex = 1 + x + x2/(1 + a). Further, deﬁne q ≡ zΦ(z)/x where






. Then, for any
given q, the unique equilibrium of the stage II subgame is as follows.
(a) If p > kex/x1−a and q > q, a fraction α ∈ (0,1) of workers are active with
search intensity λA > 0 and fraction 1−α of workers are inactive with λ = 0.
(b) If p > kex/x1−a and q ≤ q, all workers search with the same intensity λ∗ > 0
which is increasing in p/k.
(c) If p ≤ kex/x1−a, all workers are inactive with λ = 0.
Proof: Appendix.
When there are suﬃciently many jobs per worker (q ≤ q), all workers decide to
search with the same intensity. When this condition is violated, however, some
workers cease to search at all, whilst others search with intensity λA. Workers must
be indiﬀerent between the search and the no–search strategies, so Uz(λA) = 0 holds.
This requirement together with the ﬁrst–order condition U′
z(λA) = 0 determine
the job–oﬀer probability z and search intensity for active workers λA. Therefore,
these two numbers depend on productivity p and on the search cost function, but
they are independent of q. On the other hand, z is related to the average search
8intensity λ = αλA according to equation (1).5 Let λq = Φ(z) be the inverse of this
relation, with Φ deﬁned in Proposition 2. Then the fraction of active searchers is
α = Φ(z)/(qλA), which also shows that the number of active searchers per job αq
is independent of market tightness 1/q. Put diﬀerently, any increase in job creation
triggers a proportional increase in search activity. With the uniformly elastic search













, α = Φ(z)
qλA
. (5)
Corollary: In a mixed–strategy equilibrium, search intensity of active workers λA,
the job–oﬀer probability z and the ratio of active workers per job αq are all inde-
pendent of the worker–job ratio. The job–ﬁnding probability is α(1 − e−λAz), which
increases proportionately with 1/q.
Although Proposition 2 is derived for a uniformly elastic cost function, I conjecture
that results are similar for any arbitrary convex cost function with positive slope
at λ = 0 in which case the no–search strategy is a local maximum. All workers
are active with the same search intensity when the labor market is tight (small q),
whilst some workers are inactive when labor market prospects are less favorable
from workers’ perspective (large q). In the following, q denotes the threshold value
of the worker–ﬁrm ratio separating an equilibrium with inactive workers from one
without (where q = ∞ is a possibility).
2.4 Free entry
To determine the endogenous number of jobs, note that a ﬁrm’s proﬁt is p whenever
it has at least one applicant and when the chosen applicant has no other oﬀer.
Otherwise proﬁt is zero. When suﬃciently many ﬁrms enter, there are no inactive









q p , q ≤ q . (6)
5Note that αλA/N = λ/N is the probability that a given worker i applies at a given ﬁrm j.
Hence λ is also the expected number of applications per worker and z = (1 − e−λq)/(λq) is the
probability of an oﬀer, conditional on applying. The proof is the same as in footnote 4.
9The expression in squared brackets is the probability that the ﬁrm has at least one
applicant, and the second term is the probability that a randomly chosen applicant
has no other oﬀer. For ﬁxed λ∗, proﬁt is strictly increasing in q: the larger the
worker–job ratio, the more likely it is that a ﬁrm ﬁnds an applicant and the less
likely it is that an applicant has multiple oﬀers. When the eﬀect of q on λ∗ is taken
into account, the overall impact of q on π is more complex since both the eﬀect
of q on λ∗ and the one of λ∗ on π are generally ambiguous. However, numerical
experiments with the uniformly elastic cost function have shown that π is strictly
increasing in q for arbitrary choices of the parameter p/k.







−λAzp , q > q .
Again the ﬁrst expression is the probability to receive at least one application (since
the number of applications at every ﬁrm is Poisson distributed with mean αλAq =
Φ(z)), and the second term is the probability that an active searcher gets no second
oﬀer, conditional on having one (since the number of job oﬀers for active searchers is
Poisson distributed with mean λAz). Importantly, expected proﬁt in the range q > q
does not depend on the worker–ﬁrm ratio q, since z and λA are independent of q (note
that this result does not depend on the functional form of the search cost function).
In contrast to standard search models, more entry does not reduce the chance to
ﬁnd a worker since the number of active searchers increases proportionately with
the number of jobs. For the same reason, the chance that a contacted worker has
another other oﬀer does not increase with the number of job openings.
The equilibrium worker–job ratio balances the cost for the marginal entrant to ex-
pected proﬁt:
π(q) = c(1/q) . (7)
Whenever c is strictly increasing with appropriate boundary conditions, there is a
unique solution to this equation. To summarize, an equilibrium is a worker–ﬁrm
ratio q∗ solving equation (7) together with the following search behavior of workers:
1. If q∗ ≤ q, all workers search with common intensity λ∗ which is the larger
solution to equation (4).
2. If q∗ > q, share α of workers search actively with intensity λA, while all others
remain inactive.
102.5 Comparative statics
Suppose that job surplus p increases (for example, because productivity goes up or
unemployment income falls). For a given number of ﬁrms, such a change has the
following eﬀects on search behavior. In a pure–strategy equilibrium, the common
search intensity λ∗ increases unambiguously in p (Proposition 1, and similarly in
Proposition 2(b)).6 In a mixed–strategy equilibrium, both the number of active
workers α and their search intensity λA are increasing in p (see equations (5)). Also
the threshold value q increases; thus inactivity disappears when productivity is high
enough. A larger job surplus raises the return to search, which unambiguously
increases search activity and search intensity in this model for given q.
What is the eﬀect of the productivity increase on job creation? The impact on ﬁrm
proﬁt in the range q > q is unambiguously positive: a larger p raises the chance to
ﬁnd a worker (because more workers become active) and raises output in a ﬁlled
job. In the range q ≤ q the eﬀect is less clear–cut. Although the chance to ﬁnd a
worker and job surplus go up again, the eﬀect on the middle term in (6) is negative:
the higher search intensity implies that workers are more likely to get a second oﬀer
in which case job proﬁt would drop to zero. However, all my numerical experiments
conﬁrm that the overall impact of p on ﬁrm proﬁt is positive. Hence, an increase in
productivity raises the job–to–worker ratio 1/q.
Figure 1 shows how job creation responds to such an increase in p, both in a pure–
strategy equilibrium where all workers are active and in a mixed–strategy equilib-
rium where some workers are inactive, for diﬀerent levels of the entry cost function.
In the regime without inactive workers (q ≤ q ≈ .55), the eﬀect of a 20 percent
increase of p on q is relatively modest: q cannot fall by more than 10 percent, even
when entry costs are perfectly inelastic. In the regime with inactive workers, how-
ever, the reaction of q to an increase in p can be large: since π(q) is ﬂat in the range
q > q, the elasticity of q with respect to p tends to inﬁnity when the elasticity of c
with respect to 1/q tends to zero.
6In this respect, the model diﬀers from the one of Shimer (2004) where search intensity can also
fall with higher job surplus.
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Figure 1: The response of the worker–ﬁrm ratio q to a productivity increase from
pL = 1 to pH = 1.2 with k(λ) = .1 · λ for two exemplary entry cost functions c1
(pure–strategy equilibrium) and c2 (mixed–strategy equilibrium).
2.6 Eﬃciency
In the model of Albrecht et al. (2006), the decentralized equilibrium is ineﬃcient
along two margins: entry is excessive and workers send too many applications.7 The
ﬁrst ineﬃciency also occurs in this model, but the second one must be qualiﬁed. In
addition, another ineﬃciency emerges: it is never socially optimal that a fraction of
workers remains inactive. To obtain these results, consider the problem of a social
planner whose objective is to maximize total surplus per worker net of the costs of
search and entry, with respect to λ and q:
max
λ,q




7Albrecht et al. prove the ﬁrst ineﬃciency only, but conduct numerical experiments for the
second one.
12Observe ﬁrst that the planner’s objective is strictly concave in search intensity λ.
Thus, it is never optimal to let fraction α ∈ (0,1) of workers search with positive
intensity λA while others are inactive. The planner rather prefers that all workers
search with the same common intensity αλA. Generally, the planner’s objective
depends on a distribution of search intensities, rather than a common intensity as
it is written here. However, it is easy to show that nonparticipation of a fraction















Consider ﬁrst the entry margin for a given common search intensity λ of workers.
In the decentralized equilibrium, the worker–ﬁrm ratio equates proﬁt as in (6) to
marginal entry cost c(1/q). On the other hand, the right–hand–side in the optimality
condition (9) is strictly increasing in q and smaller than proﬁt π(q). Hence, the
worker–job ratio q is too small in the decentralized equilibrium; entry is excessive.
The explanation for the ineﬃciency is a similar “business–stealing eﬀect” as it is
discussed in Albrecht et al. (2006, p. 877): the social beneﬁt of an additional vacancy
falls short of the private beneﬁt since the vacancy can attract workers from other
ﬁrms whose vacancies are then left unﬁlled. Put diﬀerently, wages do not internalize
the negative externality that an entrant exerts on incumbents who might lose all
their applicants to the entrant ﬁrm. The ineﬃciency could go away if the wage
for workers with one oﬀer was greater than the monopsony wage (for example, if
there is Nash bargaining with an appropriate choice of worker bargaining power).
Obviously, in the limit λ → ∞ this business–stealing eﬀect disappears and entry
becomes eﬃcient, reconﬁrming the results of Julien et al. (2000).
Consider now the search intensity margin for a given worker–job ratio q ≤ q. Search
intensity in the decentralized equilibrium is the larger solution to equation (4). The
right–hand–side of the optimality condition (8) is declining in λ. Hence, equilibrium
search intensity λ∗ is too large if and only if the right–hand–side of (4) is smaller
8Proof: in the mixed–strategy equilibrium, net surplus is α[m(αq,λA)p − k(λA)], but if all
workers search with intensity αλA, surplus is m(q,αλA)p − k(αλA). Weak convexity of k implies
αk(λA) ≥ k(αλA), and concavity of 1 − e−x implies that αm(αq,λA) < m(q,αλA).







2 > 1 .
This inequality is true for all values of q > 0 and λ∗ ≥ 1, but it may be violated when
λ∗ < 1 and q is not too large. When all workers send more than one application on
average, search is socially excessive since workers impose a negative externality on
other workers: because ﬁrms cannot coordinate their job oﬀers, some workers receive
no oﬀers while others receive multiple oﬀers. This externality is not internalized; on
the contrary, workers desire to receive two or more oﬀers, so the incentive to send a
large number of applications is strong. Indeed, with a linear search cost function, λ∗
is always larger than 1.9 In other situations, however, search intensity can also be
ineﬃciently low. For instance, with k(λ) = λ2/4, q = 1 and p = 1, the equilibrium
at λ∗ = .38 is smaller than the social optimum at λ = .65.
Proposition 3: A mixed–strategy equilibrium where fraction α ∈ (0,1) of workers
searches actively with intensity λA is never socially optimal: welfare would increase
if all workers searched with common intensity αλA. A pure–strategy equilibrium
(q∗,λ∗) is not socially optimal since welfare can be raised by increasing q at given
λ∗. Moreover when λ∗ ≥ 1, welfare can be raised by lowering λ at given q∗.
3 Quantitative exploration
3.1 The matching function
I will ﬁrst demonstrate that this coordination–friction model with a reasonable
choice of the period length and with ﬁxed search intensity is unable to match the em-
pirical response of the job–ﬁnding rate with respect to the vacancy–unemployment
ratio. Any linearly homogeneous and concave matching technology gives rise to an
increasing and concave relation between the vacancy–unemployment ratio θ = 1/q
and the job–ﬁnding probability ϕ(θ). In my model this relation is given by equation
(2), rewritten as
ϕ(θ) = 1 − e
−θ(1−e−λ/θ) .
9This follows from the second–order condition which requires that λz ≥ 1 and hence λ ≥ 1/z >
1.
14I choose the period length to be one week and set λ to pin down the average weekly
job–ﬁnding rate. A short period length is appropriate for this coordination friction
model (as for the others discussed below) since workers send applications only once
in a period and since ﬁrms can contact only one worker per period.
Robert Shimer calculates the average monthly job–ﬁnding rate in postwar U.S. data
to be around 0.45.10 On a weekly basis, this leads to ϕ = 1 − .551/4.35 ≈ 0.128. As
in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007), the mean vacancy–unemployment ratio is set
at θ = 0.634 in order to be consistent with Den Haan, Ramey and Watson’s (2000)
estimate of the mean job–ﬁlling rate.11 These numbers imply that λ = 0.155. Hence,
an average unemployed worker sends one application within 6.5 weeks and gets a
job after after applying with a chance of z = (1 − e−λq)/(λq) = 88.7%. The ﬁrst
number seems too small and the second one too large. However, the consideration
of an (irrelevant) mismatch parameter can help explain these magnitudes. Suppose
workers sends λ0 applications on average, and that the ﬁrm observes match–speciﬁc
productivity after it receives the application. With probability µ the worker ﬁts the
job, but with probability 1 − µ the worker’s productivity is too low for the ﬁrm to
be willing to oﬀer the position. Then each worker sends only λ = µλ0 “eﬀective
applications” (those that result in productive matches) which may be much smaller
than the average number of actual applications λ0. Similarly, λq is the average
number of eﬀective applications per vacancy, and z is the oﬀer probability for an
eﬀective application. The actual number of applications and the probability to draw
high match–speciﬁc productivity are irrelevant for the quantitative analysis. All that
matters are the eﬀective application rates.
The main result of this analysis is that the elasticity of the matching function is
too low compared to empirical measures. Shimer (2005) estimates the elasticity of
the job–ﬁnding rate with respect to the vacancy–unemployment ratio to be 0.28;
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) conclude in their survey that the plausible range
for this elasticity is the interval [0.3,0.5]. With my matching technology and the
empirical values for θ and λ (targeting the average ϕ), I obtain εϕ,θ = .109, clearly
below the range of plausible values.12
10See Shimer (2007b) and http://robert.shimer.googlepages.com/ﬂows
11All quantitative results are similar with θ = 0.454 which is obtained from the direct vacancy
measure of the Job Opening and Labor Turnover Survey for the period 12/2007–07/2007.
12This result critically depends on the choice of the period length. With a 14–day period, the
elasticity roughly doubles but is still too low. Nonetheless, a short period length is reasonable
15The result that the elasticity of the matching function is too low is not only true
in my model but in virtually all established coordination–friction models of the
literature. That is, the basic versions of such models, with homogenous agents,
with a reasonable choice of the period length, and without variable search intensity,
are unable to match the empirical elasticity of the matching function. To see this,
consider the matching function of Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2006) which is
general enough to encompass those of most other models as special cases. In their
model, every worker sends a applications, randomly (in equilibrium) to homogenous
ﬁrms. After applications arrived, each ﬁrm makes a job oﬀer to at most one worker,
rejecting all others. The model gives rise to the job–ﬁnding rate





where z(x) = (1 − e−x)/x is the probability to receive an oﬀer. The large–economy
model of Montgomery (1991) and Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) is the special case
a = 1, and the model of Julien, Kennes, and King (2000) is the limit a → ∞. For
given a (“ﬁxed search intensity”), this matching function is not ﬂexible enough to
match the job–ﬁnding rate at the empirical mean value of θ, since θ is the only free
parameter. However, match–speciﬁc productivity enriches the model suﬃciently to
achieve this requirement (see also Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)).13 When the
number of actual applications is a given parameter, match–speciﬁc productivity can
be used to target the job–ﬁnding rate. As above, suppose ﬁrms learn what applicants
are suitable after they receive applications and let µ be the probability that a worker
ﬁts the job. With this modiﬁcation, the job–ﬁnding rate becomes





When I use the parameter µ to target the weekly job–ﬁnding rate at given θ = 0.634,
I ﬁnd that µ = 0.143 (a = 1), µ = 0.0742 (a = 2), µ = 0.0153 (a = 10); hence the
expected number of eﬀective applications aµ is nearly constant and about the same
as my calibrated value for λ. With ﬁxed search intensity a, the job–ﬁnding rate
for this microfoundation of matching frictions. Most newspapers and job agencies publish job
advertisements at weekly or even higher frequency. It seems implausible that job searchers sample
such job openings at a frequency which is much longer than a week.
13Alternatively, one could try to use the number of applications a as a free parameter. However,
to match ϕ = 0.124 at θ = 0.639 requires a = .0374, a number which is not compatible with this
model which requires a ∈ IN.
16responds to little to variations in the vacancy–unemployment ratio. I compute an
elasticity of the job–ﬁnding rate with respect to the vacancy–unemployment ratio
of 0.1085 (for a = 1) and 0.1089 (for a = 100), clearly below the range of plausible
values and about the same as with my matching function.
These results suggest that other mechanisms are required in order to match coordination–
friction economies to the data. In the following, I consider a dynamic extension of
the static model in which parameters of a reduced–form search cost function are
calibrated to match the mean and elasticity of the job–ﬁnding rate. The purpose of
this study is to answer the following questions.
• How large and how volatile must search costs be to be consistent with the
data?
• What are the implications of variable search intensity for the ampliﬁcation of
shocks?
• What are the welfare implications?
3.2 The dynamic model
I embed the static model of Section 2 in a dynamic framework in discrete time t. The
environment is stationary, so I consider a steady state equilibrium and conﬁne the
quantitative analysis to comparative statics experiments. Since actual productivity
shocks are quite persistent and since adjustment to the steady state is fast, the
comparative statics response should be a reasonable approximation to the dynamic
response (see also Mortensen (2007)).
Existing jobs end with exogenous probability δ per period. There is no search on
the job, so q is the number of unemployed workers per vacancy. Flow output in
a ﬁlled job is p and ﬂow unemployment income is b. This term is interpreted to
encompass unemployment beneﬁts, income from home production, and the utility
value of leisure (in excess of an employed person), but it does not include the cost





t[wt − k(λt)] ,
17where β is the discount factor, wt is wage or unemployment income in period t,
and k(λ) = k · λ1+a/(1 + a) is the utility cost of job search at search intensity λ,
with a ≥ 0 and k > 0. The search cost function is a shortcut to capture both
the opportunity cost of foregone leisure time and the hedonic cost of job search.14
Within every period, unemployed workers and vacant jobs are matched according
to the same process as in the static model. Unmatched agents continue search in
the next period and there is no recall.
I restrict attention to a pure–strategy equilibrium where all nonemployed workers are
active searchers (so they are classiﬁed as unemployed in the usual deﬁnition). It is
straightforward to characterize mixed–strategy equilibria with inactive workers, but
they do not deliver reasonable predictions in the numerical experiments. Speciﬁcally,
in comparison with U.S. data, inactivity (i.e. nonemployed persons who want to work
but do not search) becomes too volatile relative to unemployment, and vacancies
vary too little relative to nonemployment (unemployment plus inactivity). Also the
predictions of the corollary after Proposition 2 are at odds with the evidence. Hence
the inactivity mechanism of this model can only be quantitatively relevant when it
is coupled with substantial heterogeneity.
As in the static model, there are jobs with high and low wages, depending on the
number of oﬀers a worker holds in his hand when leaving unemployment. Although
low–wage earners may have an incentive to search for better–paid jobs, I assume
that employers can identify the current employment status of an applicant and that
employed workers can renegotiate when they obtain better oﬀers later on. Under
these assumptions, employers will never oﬀer their vacant job to an employed worker,
and search on the job does not take place.15
Let V and Jj be the values of vacant and ﬁlled jobs with wages wj in job status
j = l,h. Suppose that ﬂow costs of a vacant job are c, independent of the number
14An alternative strategy (avoiding a reduced–form search cost function but ignoring hedonic
search costs) would be to include leisure time in the utility function and to calibrate the para-
meters of this function using the empirical Frisch elasticity and time–use data on work and job
search. However, since the functional relationship between the observable “search time” and the
unobservable “search intensity” λ is unclear, I refrained from pursuing this approach.
15This assumption is similar as in Julien, Kennes, and King (2006). In their model, however,
low–wage earners search on the job, but only because of between–ﬁrm productivity diﬀerentials,
which are absent here.
18of active ﬁrms. The Bellman equations are
V = −c + βV + (1 − e
−λq)e
−λzβ(J
l − V ) ,
J
l = p − w
l + β(1 − δ)J
l ,
J
h = p − w
h + β(1 − δ)J
h .
In the ﬁrst equation, ﬁrms gain only when they meet an applicant with no other
oﬀer, which happens with probability (1 − e−λq)e−λz. Otherwise they either get no
application or they oﬀer the job to a worker who has at least one other oﬀer. In this
case, Bertrand competition drives the wage wh so high that the value of the ﬁlled
job is equal to the value of a vacant job, which is zero, so it follows that wh = p.
The free–entry condition V = 0 is
c = (1 − e
−λq)e
−λz β(p − w
l)
1 − β(1 − δ) . (11)
For workers, let U and Ej be the utility value when the current state is unem-
ployment or employment in a job of status j = l,h. Workers’ Bellman equations
are










l + βδ(U − E
l) ,
E
h = p + βE
h + βδ(U − E
h) .
Here, γ(x) = 1 − (1 + x)e−x is the probability to ﬁnd a high–wage job (that is, to
obtain two or more job oﬀers) for a worker who receives x = λz oﬀers in expectation.
Since workers with only one oﬀer do not gain at the transition from unemployment
to employment, El = U must hold, which gives rise to the reservation wage equation
w
l = b − k(λ) + βγ(λz)(E
h − U) . (12)
The utility increase at a transition into a high–wage job is
E
h − U = p − w
l
1 − β(1 − δ) . (13)
As in the static model, optimal search intensity equates marginal search costs to the





h − U) . (14)
A steady–state equilibrium is a vector (z∗,λ∗,wl∗,(Eh − U)∗,q∗) solving the ﬁve
equations (1), (11), (12), (13), and (14).
193.3 Calibration
There are seven parameters (β,δ,a,k,c,b,p) which are calibrated to the U.S. econ-
omy. In comparison with calibration exercises of standard Mortensen–Pissarides
models, the two parameters of the aggregate matching function (a level and an elas-
ticity parameter) are replaced by the two parameters a and k of the reduced–form
search cost function and they play a similar role, targeting the mean and the elas-
ticity of the job–ﬁnding rate. Because wages are determined by an ex–post auction,
there is no wage bargaining parameter. Although I could easily augment the model
by Nash bargaining in those matches where a worker has no alternative oﬀers, the
result would be that wages react too much to productivity (see the discussion in 3.4
below).
As above, I specify the period length to be one week. With an annual interest
rate of 5%, this implies β = .9991. With an average weekly job–ﬁnding rate of
ϕ = .128 and an average unemployment rate of 5.6%, the weekly separation rate is
ﬁxed at δ = 0.762% which is consistent with Shimer’s (2005) measure of the monthly
separation rate of 2.6% (after adjusting for time aggregation).
Productivity is normalized at p = 1, and vacancy costs are set at Hagedorn and
Manovskii’s (2008) estimated value of c = 0.58, though I do not allow for a pro-
ductivity dependence, as they do. The remaining parameters b, k and a are pinned
down to match the following three targets; the mean job–ﬁnding rate of ϕ = 0.128,
the mean vacancy–unemployment ratio θ = 1/q = 0.634, and the elasticity of the
job–ﬁnding rate with respect to θ at εϕ,θ = 0.28 (see Section 3.1 for explanations),
provided that variation in the steady–state value of θ is driven by a permanent
productivity shift. In principle, λ (and thus ϕ) reacts to a shock for two reasons:
job surplus Eh −U changes and the job–oﬀer probability z changes. How much job
surplus changes relative to z depends of course on the source of the shock. However,
εϕ,θ does not change much when variation in θ is driven by shocks to the separa-
tion rate or to unemployment income. More precisely, when parameter a targets
εϕ,θ = 0.28 for a p shock, it can be veriﬁed that then εϕ,θ = 0.2804 (with a b shock)
and εϕ,θ = 0.2803 (with a δ shock).
The calibration targets imply that b = 0.955, k = 6051.6 and a = 5.27.16 As in
16Numerically, for given a and the targets for ϕ and θ (and hence λ and z), equation (11) yields
wl, k follows from (13) and (14) and b follows from (12). Then a is adjusted to target εϕ,θ.
20Section 3.1, mean search intensity is at λ = 0.155 and the chance to obtain an oﬀer
is z = 0.887. Mean search costs are modest at k(λ) = 0.0081, so that the ﬂow utility
from unemployment is at ˆ b = b − k(λ) = 0.947.
The reservation wage is at wl = 0.9738, so that the mean wage is at w = αwl+1−α =
0.9756, where α = λze−λz/(1 − e−λz) = 0.933 is the share of workers in low–wage
jobs. Finally, because of a > 1 and Proposition 1, the ﬁrst–order condition (14)
indeed characterizes the unique equilibrium in pure strategies. Table 1 summarizes
parameter choices and their explanation.
Parameter Value Explanation
β 0.9991 Annual interest rate 5%
δ 0.00762 Unemployment rate u = 5.6%
p 1 Normalization
c 0.58 Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)
k 6051.6 Job–ﬁnding rate ϕ = 0.128 (via λ)
b 0.955 Vacancy–unemployment ratio θ = 0.634 (via wl and Jl)
a 5.27 Matching–function elasticity εϕ,θ = 0.28
Table 1: Parameter choices.
3.4 Quantitative implications
How does the economy respond to a permanent unanticipated productivity increase?
As implied by Proposition 1, search intensity will go up. Indeed, at the calibrated
parameter values, I calculate elasticities ελ,p = 4.7 and εk(λ),p = 29.7. Although
search costs are small (only 0.8% of unemployment utility), they are quite volatile,
varying between 0.3% and 1.3% when p varies between 0.98 and 1.02. Empirical
results on the response of search intensity to market conditions are inconclusive. The
ﬁndings of Shimer (2004) do not support procyclical search intensity. He considers
CPS data and uses two measures of search intensity. One is the “probability to
search” which is irrelevant here since nonparticipation is not considered. The other
is the “number of job search methods”. However, the variability of this measure
is small and it is unclear how this number correlates with application rates and
with search time, which are relevant here. On the other hand, Krueger and Mueller
21(2008) examine time–use data and ﬁnd that job–search time responds positively to
labor market conditions. Using cross–state variation in unemployment beneﬁts, they
calculate an elasticity of job search with respect to beneﬁts of around -2. My model
yields the elasticity ελ,b0 = −1.4, where b0 = .28 = .29w is a plausible value for the
level of unemployment beneﬁts.17 If search intensity λ is proportional to job–search
time, this ﬁnding suggests that my calibration does not overstate the responsiveness
of search intensity to labor market conditions. Krueger and Mueller also ﬁnd that
an individual’s predicted wage has a strong quantitative impact on job–search time.
It is unsurprising that the model’s response of the vacancy–unemployment ratio to
a productivity shock is of the same magnitude as in the data. In fact, my level of
ﬂow unemployment income is about the same as in the calibration of Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2007) which is well known to yield a strong ampliﬁcation. This is even
true when search intensity is ﬁxed at the steady–state value, in which case I ﬁnd that
ελ ﬁxed
θ,p = 18.8, about 10 times as large as in Shimer’s (2005) calibration of the search
and matching model where ﬂow unemployment income is at ˆ b = 0.4. When search
intensity varies positively with productivity, the ampliﬁcation of productivity is even
stronger since the job–ﬁnding rate increases and hence unemployment decreases
further. However, the impact on the elasticity is modest; it merely increases to
ελ variable
θ,p = 22.9, so the order of magnitude does not change. My calibration also
gives rise to a reasonable response of wages. I calculate an elasticity of the mean
wage with respect to productivity of εw,p = 0.61. This number is a bit larger than the
estimate of εw,p = 0.45 used by Hagedorn and Manovskii to pin down the bargaining
power parameter in the Mortensen–Pissarides model. Again, this is not surprising.
In their calibration, workers get 5.2% of job surplus, whereas here 6.7% of workers
obtain the full job surplus whilst the rest works at the reservation wage, obtaining
zero surplus. Therefore the wage response in my model is somewhat stronger, and
this is the reason why it makes little sense to augment the model by Nash bargaining
in one–one matches.
It is instructive to see what happens when the level of unemployment utility is
reduced to the value used by Shimer (2005) in his calibration of the search–and–
matching model. To this end, I choose b to obtain in steady state ˆ b = b−k(λ) = 0.4.
In the absence of a Nash bargaining parameter, it is clear that this choice blows up
proﬁts, so I set now c = 6.61 to still target the steady–state vacancy–unemployment
17See Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005) who calculate a replacement ratio for the U.S. of 29%.
22ratio at θ = 0.634. Again a is chosen to target εϕ,θ = 0.28, and k is chosen to
target ϕ = 0.128. Interestingly, the elasticity of search costs a = 5.27 is the same
as before, but k is about one order of magnitude larger. Hence I ﬁnd that search
costs are k(λ) = .092, now more than 20% of unemployment utility. On the other
hand, the responsiveness of search intensity (and search costs) are reduced by an
order of magnitude; that is ελ,p = 0.416. As with the original parameter values,
variable search intensity raises the responsiveness of the vacancy–unemployment
ratio only slightly. Speciﬁcally, εθ,p increases from 1.65 with ﬁxed intensity to 2.01
with variable search intensity.
3.5 Welfare
Results from section 2.6. show that equilibrium is not eﬃcient in general: entry
is excessive and search intensity can be too high or too low. The dynamic model
requires a separate analysis of the welfare issue. One important adjustment concerns
the role of unemployment beneﬁts which are pure transfers and do not contribute to
welfare.18 However, beneﬁts induce a wedge between the private and the social job
surplus, which dampens the incentives to search for workers and ﬁrms. This eﬀect
counteracts my previous ﬁndings that entry is excessive and that search intensity is
excessive when λ > 1.
Because of quasilinear preferences, the planner’s objective is to maximize a utili-
tarian welfare function which adds up the discounted value of the income stream









′ = u + δ(1 − u) − m(q,λ)u
)
. (15)
Here u is the unemployment rate (the only state variable), W(u) is welfare when
current unemployment is u, m(q,λ) is the matching function (2), and ˜ b = b − b0 is
18Of course, matters would be diﬀerent if workers were risk averse and markets were incomplete.
In their welfare analysis, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) correct for distortionary taxes, but they
ignore any positive role of government.
23ﬂow unemployment utility net of beneﬁts b0 and gross of search costs. I obtain the
following characterization of the social optimum.
Proposition 4: In the social optimum, the unemployment–vacancy ratio q and
search intensity λ are independent of the state variable u and satisfy the ﬁrst–order
conditions
c = βe






where z = (1 − e−λq)/(λq) and
S = p −˜ b + k(λ)
1 + βδ − βe
−λz(1 + λz) + βλe
−λze
−λq
is the social value of an employed person.
Proof: Appendix.
The intuition behind the optimality conditions is easy to explain. In (16), the term
e−λz[1−(1+λq)e−λq] is the same as d[m(q,λ)]/d[1/q], i.e. the number of new matches
of an additional vacancy. Hence the term on the right–hand side is the social return
of a vacancy which must be equal to marginal cost on the left–hand side. Similarly
in (17), the term e−λze−λq is the same as d[m(q,λ)]/d[λ], so the right–hand side is
the marginal social return of an additional unit of search intensity.
When there are no unemployment beneﬁts, it is straightforward to show that entry




−λq) p − b + k(λ)
1 + βδ − βe
−λz(1 + λz)
. (18)
It follows immediately that the right–hand side of (16) is smaller than the right–
hand side of (18), at the same values of λ and q when b = ˜ b. Since the right–hand
side of (16) is increasing in q, the equilibrium level of q is smaller than the socially
optimal level of q (at given λ). Hence, for any given level of search intensity, there
is too much entry. Obviously, this result can change when beneﬁts b − ˜ b > 0 are
large enough.
Table 2 compares the equilibrium at the benchmark calibration with the social
optimum, where I set beneﬁts to b0 = .28, at 29% of the mean wage (see footnote 17).
24Compared with the social optimum, equilibrium search intensity is about 25 percent
too low, and the vacancy–unemployment ratio 1/q is more than twice as large. The
planner would choose about the same unemployment rate, but the optimal vacancy
rate would be about half of what is in the data. Nonetheless, total welfare W(u) is
only about 1% below optimum. The last three columns of the table show the three
components of ﬂow surplus: output, ﬂow utility of the unemployed, and vacancy
costs. The planner would like to reduce unemployment utility slightly (by inducing
them to search more) and create fewer vacancies; actual output (employment) would
increase only minimally.
λ q u(%) Welfare Flow Flow utility of Vacancy
output unemployed costs
Equilibrium 0.155 1.577 5.6 1063.7 0.944 0.037 0.021
Social opt. 0.207 3.712 5.36 1075.6 0.946 0.033 0.008
Table 2: Equilibrium versus social optimum.
4 Conclusion
This paper develops a model of coordination frictions with variable search inten-
sity in which equilibrium can be fully characterized by a simple set of ﬁrst–order
conditions. Under bad labor market conditions, there can be an equilibrium where
only a fraction of workers are active searchers whilst the rest stays out of the labor
market. This inactivity phenomenon is not socially desirable; the planner desires
that all homogenous workers search with a common intensity. But even under better
labor market conditions, equilibrium is typically ineﬃcient, as there are too many
vacancies and a suboptimal level of search intensity. In the quantitative part of this
paper, I argue that variable search intensity helps to improve the ﬁt of coordination–
friction models which typically have a too low matching–function elasticity, and I
examine the comparative statics features of a reasonably calibrated dynamic model.
Of course, variable search intensity may not be the only mechanism raising the
responsiveness of the job–ﬁnding rate. Lester (2008) shows that an endogenous ca-
pacity choice in the model of Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) can also raise the
elasticity of the job–ﬁnding rate with respect to productivity.
25The following two extensions are left for future work. The ﬁrst is the eﬀect of
heterogeneity on search intensities. On the one hand, when there are jobs with
high and low productivities, it is interesting to know whether workers search too
hard for the good jobs and too little for the bad ones, and how much they diversify
their “search portfolio”. A similar issue is analyzed in Gautier and Wolthoﬀ (2007).
On the other hand, when workers are endowed with diﬀerent skills, it should be
understood how much search intensities between skill groups diﬀer, and what the
implications are for skill diﬀerences in wages and employment rates.
Another variation concerns the wage determination mechanism. If ﬁrms commit to
posted wages and workers apply after sampling these postings, there should be wage
dispersion similarly as in the model of Burdett and Judd (1983). Such a model can
also be examined when ﬁrms are able to recall all their applicants as in Kircher’s
(2007) model.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Consider the best response problem of a particular worker deciding search intensity
λ when all others search with intensity λ0. Let z = z(λ0) = [1−e−λ0q]/(λ0q) be the
chance to receive an oﬀer when applying. The worker’s best response is the solution
to U′






Because of a > 1, this equation has a unique solution which is the global maximum
of Uz(.). Hence, for any λ0 there is a unique best response, denoted λ = S(z(λ0)) ≡
R(λ0). Moreover, because of z(0) = 1 and z(∞) = 0, R(0) > 0 and R(∞) = 0.
Since R is continuous, a Nash equilibrium λ = R(λ) > 0 exists.
To prove uniqueness, it suﬃces to show that R′(λ) = S′[z(λ)]z′(λ) < 1 at any
λ = R(λ). One has
z





and implicit diﬀerentiation of (19) yields
S
′(z) = λ(2 − λz)
λz
2 + (a − 1)z
.
26Combining these two shows that R′(λ) < 1 (at any λ = R(λ)) is equivalent to
−(2 − λz)[1 − e
−λq(1 + λq)]
[λz
2 + (a − 1)z]λq
< 1 . (20)
With a > 1, a suﬃcient condition for this inequality is that
−(2 − λz)[1 − e
−λq(1 + λq)] < z
2λ
2q .
Substitution of z = (1 − e−λq)/(λq) obtains the equivalent
2e
λq − 2 − 2λq > λe
−λq − λ .
This inequality is satisﬁed since the right–hand side is negative and since ex > 1+x.
Lastly, the unique Nash equilibrium λ∗ increases in p/k because the best–response
curve R(.) shifts upwards when p/k increases, which follows immediately from (19)
deﬁning λ = S(z). 2
Proof of Proposition 2:
Consider again the best–response problem of a particular worker when λ0 is the
average search intensity of other workers (who either all search with intensity λ0,
or fraction α search with intensity λA = λ0/α). As in the proof of Proposition
1, z = z(λ0) is the job–oﬀer probability conditional on applying. The worker’s
objective function Uz(λ) has an interior local maximum whenever the increasing,
strictly concave λa has two positive intersections with the hump–shaped λz2e−λzp/k.






This is the same as







which is the same as
λ0 < ˆ λ0 ≡ 1
qΦ(ˆ z) .
Therefore, for any λ0 < ˆ λ0, Uz(λ) has an interior local maximum, to be denoted


















27Therefore, λ = R(λ0) is a global maximum (that is, Uz(λ) ≥ 0 so that a deviation
to λ = 0 does not raise payoﬀ) if and only if
λz ≥ x , (21)
where x is the unique positive solution of
e
x = 1 + x + x
2
1 + a .








holds. Because eλz/(λz)1−a is increasing in λz ≥ 1 − a (where λz > 1 − a follows
from the second–order condition U
′′
















Therefore, λ = R(λ0) > 0 is best response to λ0 iﬀ
λ0 ≤ λ0 ≡ 1
qΦ(z) ,
and it is the unique best response if the inequality is strict. Note also that λ0 > ˆ λ0.
Further, for any λ0 ≥ λ0, λ = 0 is best response to λ0, and it is the unique best
response when the inequality is strict.
Since λ0 ≤ 0 is equivalent to z ≥ 1, λ = 0 is the unique Nash equilibrium when p ≤
kex/x1−a (part (c) of the Proposition). When p > kex/x1−a is satisﬁed, λ0 > 0 holds.
In that case, a pure–strategy equilibrium exists when R(λ0) ≤ λ0 (in which case the
best response curve R(λ0) crosses the 45–degree line at some λ0 ≤ λ0), whereas a
mixed–strategy equilibrium exists when this inequality is reversed (in which case
the 45–degree line is “crossed” as the best response correspondence jumps at λ0).
By deﬁnition of λ0 and z, the suﬃcient condition for a pure–strategy equilibrium is
R(λ0) = x
z ≤ λ0 = 1
qΦ(z) ,
which is the same as
q ≤ q ≡ zΦ(z)
x .
28This condition is not only suﬃcient but also necessary for a pure–strategy equilib-
rium provided that R′(λ) < 1 holds at any λ = R(λ) (so that the 45–degree line can
be crossed at most once). This condition then also implies that the Nash equilibrium
is unique. As in the proof of Proposition 1, R′(λ) < 1 holds at any λ = R(λ) if
condition (20) holds. The denominator on the left–hand side is positive because of
the second–order condition λz > 1 − a. Hence, the inequality is
−(2 − λz)[1 − e
−λq(1 + λq)] < λq[λz
2 + (a − 1)z] .
Substitution of z = (1 − e−λq)/(λq) yields
2λq < λ(1 − e
−λq) + (1 + a)(e
λq − 1) .
Again because of the second–order condition λ ≥ (1 − a)/z = (1 − a)λq/(1 − e−λq),
a suﬃcient condition for this inequality is that
2λq < (1 − a)λq + (1 + a)(e
λq − 1) .
This is the same as
0 < (e
λq − 1 − λq)(1 + a) ,
which is obviously true for any λ > 0. 2
Proof of Proposition 4:
As in section 7.2 of Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005), it is straigtforward to
show that W(.) is aﬃne–linear; it takes the form W(u) = w0 − S · u where S is
marginal social value of an employed worker. Diﬀerentiation of (15) with respect to
u together with the envelope theorem yields
S = p −˜ b + k(λ) + c/q + βS(e
−λz − δ) . (22)






−λz[1 − (1 + λq)e
−λq]S . (24)
These conditions conﬁrm that optimal λ and q do not depend on the state variable
u, so W(.) is indeed aﬃne–linear. Both ﬁrst–order conditions are the same as in
Proposition 4. The value S follows after substitution of (24) into (22) and solving
for S. 2
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